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ARTICLE

BIVENS REMEDIES AND THE MYTH
OF THE “HEADY DAYS”
STEPHEN I. VLADECK*

In his concurring opinion in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko in
2001,1 Justice Scalia famously explained that the Supreme Court’s reluctance to infer “new” remedies under the Bivens 2 doctrine was part of a
larger pattern in which the Court disfavored judicial recognition of any
causes of action not expressly created by Congress. As he wrote, “Bivens is
a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers
to create causes of action—decreeing them to be ‘implied’ by the mere
existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition.”3 Invoking the Court’s
decision from seven months earlier in Alexander v. Sandoval 4 as proof that
“we have abandoned that power to invent ‘implications’ in the statutory
field,”5 Justice Scalia concluded that “[t]here is even greater reason to abandon it in the constitutional field, since an ‘implication’ imagined in the Constitution can presumably not even be repudiated by Congress.”6
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* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship, American University Washington
College of Law. My thanks to Greg Sisk for inviting me to participate in the symposium that led
to this essay, to Jim Pfander and Carlos Vázquez for helpful conversations, and to the editors of
the University of St. Thomas Law Journal for their patience.
1. 534 U.S. 61 (2001). The issue in Malesko was whether a federal prisoner could maintain
a Bivens action against the private operators of a halfway house under contract with the Federal
Bureau of Prisons. Writing for a 5-4 Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist answered that question in the
negative. See id. at 70–74.
2. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (holding that a private plaintiff may sue federal officers directly under the Fourth Amendment for damages arising out of a violation thereof).
3. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S.
537, 568 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting this passage).
4. 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (refusing to recognize a private cause of action to enforce regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice to enforce section 602 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
5. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
6. Id.

31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 113 Side B

05/11/2012 16:54:17

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST310.txt

514

unknown

Seq: 2

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

11-MAY-12

13:21

[Vol. 8:3

C M
Y K

05/11/2012 16:54:17

7. See, e.g., Pollard v. GEO Group, Inc., 629 F.3d 843, 859 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted
sub nom. Minneci v. Pollard, 131 S. Ct. 2449 (May 16, 2011) (No. 10-1104); Boney v. Valline,
597 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1182 (D. Nev. 2009).
8. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV.
343; Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal
Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to
Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097
(2006).
9. 536 U.S. 273, 283–84 (2003).
10. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Allen, 396 F. Supp. 2d 545, 554 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
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This passage from Malesko has been repeatedly cited by lower courts
in subsequent cases.7 It is perhaps the single best testament to a broader
trend documented by numerous scholars, in which the Supreme Court has
made it increasingly difficult, over the past two decades, to recognize
causes of action for private plaintiffs to challenge official misconduct at
both the state and federal levels.8 Indeed, this trend has also seeped into
jurisprudence concerning express causes of action, with the Court holding
in Gonzaga University v. Doe that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be used to enforce a federal statute against a state officer unless Congress, in that statute,
unambiguously intended to create a privately enforceable right—citing Sandoval, among other decisions, in support.9
Whatever one’s views about these decisions in general, what cannot be
gainsaid is the extent to which lower courts and commentators over the past
decade have treated these doctrinal developments as being in line with each
other—whether for better or worse.10 To that end, it presumably follows
that judicial reluctance to infer remedies from constitutional provisions
under Bivens necessarily derives from—or is at the very least analytically
related to—the Court’s more systematic reluctance to infer remedies from
federal statutes that fail to provide an express cause of action under
Sandoval.
In this short symposium essay, I suggest that, however descriptively
accurate it may be to compare the contemporaneous developments in these
discrete bodies of jurisprudence, it is analytically incoherent to conclude
that one follows from the other. More to the point, conflating the federal
courts’ power to infer statutory causes of action with their power to fashion
constitutional remedies inverts the very different role Congress plays in the
two spheres and fails to account for the distinct considerations, and precedents, that factor into the existence vel non of judicial remedies for constitutional claims. Put simply, reading these two lines of cases together distorts
the fundamentally distinct considerations that animate them and thereby
risks obscuring the critical constitutional questions lurking in Bivens’
background.
To unpack this thesis, I begin in Part I with a brief overview of the
Court’s jurisprudence with respect to both implied statutory causes of action and Bivens. In Part II, I turn specifically to the claim at the heart of
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Justice Scalia’s Malesko concurrence and why contemporary courts should
not take the Sandoval-Bivens analogy seriously. Whether or not the early
1970s were “heady days” in which the Supreme Court “assumed commonlaw powers to create causes of action” should ultimately be immaterial in
resolving whether the Constitution requires a judicial remedy in appropriate
cases.
I. THE SHORT COURSE

ON

IMPLIED REMEDIES

In tracing Bivens to the “heady days” in his Malesko concurrence, Justice Scalia no doubt had in mind the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak,11 which endorsed the sweeping proposition that “it is the
duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to
make effective the congressional purpose” reflected in a particular statute.12
As Justice Rehnquist put it in 1979:
Congress, at least during the [1960s,] tended to rely to a large
extent on the courts to decide whether there should be a private
right of action, rather than determining this question for itself.
Cases such as [Borak,] and numerous cases from other federal
courts, gave Congress good reason to think that the federal judiciary would undertake this task.13
And yet, although Borak may have come at the high-water mark of the
Court’s recognition of non-express causes of action, it clearly was not the
beginning.
A. Implied Nonstatutory Remedies
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11. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
12. Id. at 433. To be fair, Justice Scalia’s Malesko concurrence only cites to Sandoval for this
proposition. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001)). But both the majority opinion in
Malesko, see id. at 67 n.3 (majority opinion), and the cited passage in Sandoval, see 532 U.S. at
287, single out Borak as emblematic of “the understanding of private causes of action that held
sway . . . when Title VI was enacted.”
13. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
14. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
15. See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) (citing Slocum v. Mayberry, 15
U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 10, 12 (1817)) (“When it comes to suits for damages for abuse of power,
federal officials are usually governed by local law.”).
16. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (plurality opinion). For more on the interaction between officer suits and sovereign immunity, including the convoluted history of the
“party-of-record” rule, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 850–55 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 6th ed. 2009). See also
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Indeed, by the time Borak was decided, it was black-letter law that
federal officers could be held liable under state (or, as was typically the case
prior to Erie,14 “general”) law,15 at least where sovereign or official immunity did not preclude recovery.16 Although cases abound, a particularly tell-
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ing early example is Teal v. Felton, an 1852 decision in which the Supreme
Court unanimously upheld the power of the New York state courts to entertain an action in trover against a federal postmaster, specifically rejecting
the argument that federal jurisdiction in suits against federal officers should
be exclusive.17 Many of these cases began in state court, but Professor
Woolhandler has documented numerous instances in which federal courts
afforded similar relief,18 both in diversity cases before Congress provided
for general federal question jurisdiction in 187519 and pursuant to either
diversity or the federal courts’ “arising under” jurisdiction thereafter.20 Inasmuch as claims ostensibly arising under state law could also encompass
privileges or immunities grounded in the federal Constitution, “constitutional torts” could thereby be litigated as a species of common-law torts,
despite the absence of an underlying statutory cause of action.21
Scholars have long debated whether these cases are best understood as
state law causes of action raising federal claims or suits that, by “imperceptible steps,” transmogrified from state law remedies into federal
causes of action.22 But whether such state law remedies were themselves
compelled by the Constitution or were available merely as a matter of state
law, the upshot for present purposes is a resulting jurisprudence of private
litigation against federal officers without any regard for congressional
intent.

05/11/2012 16:54:17
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Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REV.
439, 457 (2006) (explaining “Larson-Malone sovereign immunity doctrine”).
17. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1852); see also Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New
Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 81–82 & n.171 (1975) (noting that state courts “clearly have
power to impose personal liability against federal officers”).
18. See Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 85–88 (1997); see also Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 1109 (1969) (explaining constitutional remedies generally and describing the issue of
whether the right to relief against a federal officer arises under state or federal law); Richard S.
Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 YALE L.J. 1385 (1964) (explaining why state courts appropriately have jurisdiction over federal officials). For an earlier
treatment of similar issues reaching comparable conclusions, see James L. Bishop, The Jurisdiction of State and Federal Courts Over Federal Officers, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 397 (1909).
19. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 474 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2006)).
20. See Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Acts, and the Scope
of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1496 (1989).
21. See, e.g., JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 66 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007). Moreover, whereas early cases were often
about damages or other forms of legal relief, the Supreme Court after Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908), repeatedly recognized a comparable power on the part of federal district courts to
enjoin federal executive officers from unconstitutional actions despite the absence of a statute
specifically authorizing such relief. See, e.g., Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 290 (1944); Shields
v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R. Co., 305 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1938).
22. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 489, 524 (1954); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 353–54 (1993). For a summary of
Hart’s views—and their difficulties—see Woolhandler, supra note 18, at 100 n.116.
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23. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24. Louise Weinberg, The Monroe Mystery Solved: Beyond the “Unhappy History” Theory
of Civil Rights Litigation, 1991 BYU L. REV. 737, 761 (1991).
25. James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 977 n.294
(1997).
26. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975) (describing federal common law civil liberties,
including the right to collect damages from federal officers).
27. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
28. See id. at 683–85.
29. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 391 (1971).
30. Id. at 395.
31. Id. at 392.
32. Id. at 397; see also id. at 406 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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As Louise Weinberg has explained, Erie23 may well have precipitated
the next step because it “sorted out the respective common law powers of
the nation and the states, and thus cleared the way for unambiguously federal common law, binding on the states under the supremacy clause.”24
Whereas the pre-Erie regime of general common law allowed the federal
courts to exercise both procedural and substantive control over the law governing tort suits against government officers, “Erie posed a rather obvious
threat to such control, famously foreswearing any body of general federal
common law and raising questions about the extent to which the measure of
federal official liability for constitutional torts might appear to depend on
tort principles defined by state courts.”25 The effect was an effort by courts
and commentators alike to articulate theories of “constitutional common
law,” in other words, the possibility that some provisions of the U.S. Constitution might provide a self-executing damages remedy separate from
those that were already available under state or federal law.26 When first
confronted with such an argument during its 1945 Term, the Supreme Court
in Bell v. Hood ducked,27 holding only that it was a sufficiently plausible
theory on which to sustain subject-matter jurisdiction under the federal
question statute before remanding for further proceedings.28
Thus, when the issue came back to the Court in Bivens, the Court took
for granted the existence of common-law damages remedies and largely
understood the question before it as whether the common-law remedy
should remain the exclusive one. It rejected the government’s argument for
such exclusivity as “unduly restrictive,”29 and it recognized an “independent” federal claim affording damages to victims of Fourth Amendment
violations by federal officials,30 “regardless of whether the State in whose
jurisdiction [the federal] power is exercised would . . . penalize the identical
act if engaged in by a private citizen.”31 The Court also explicitly rejected
the government’s argument that the federal remedy need be “indispensable”
for vindicating the Fourth Amendment.32 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan
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instead posed the question as whether damages were “‘necessary’ or ‘appropriate’ to the vindication of the interest asserted.”33
But what is most telling about Bivens is the Court’s discussion of Congress. Even though the federal government, and the Bivens dissenters, argued vigorously that a federal remedy should turn largely on whether
Congress had given its explicit or implicit imprimatur, Justice Brennan
disagreed:
[W]e have here no explicit congressional declaration that persons
injured by a federal officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment
may not recover money damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view
of Congress. The question is merely whether petitioner, if he can
demonstrate an injury consequent upon the violation by federal
agents of his Fourth Amendment rights, is entitled to redress his
injury through a particular remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts.34
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33. Id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 397 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 396.
36. 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980).
37. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (noting the “‘serious constitutional
question’ that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a
colorable constitutional claim”) (citing Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S.
667, 681 n.12 (1986)).
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In other words, although Congress could attempt to displace such a
remedy, the Court’s power to fashion relief did not require—or implicitly
derive from—some affirmative legislative sanction. Thus, a Bivens remedy
should be available unless Congress had displaced it, or, as Justice Brennan
explained, “special factors counseling hesitation”35 mitigated against such
relief.
In Carlson v. Green, Justice Brennan went one step further, suggesting
that Congress could only displace a Bivens remedy by “provid[ing] an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery
directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective.”36 So understood, the question was not whether Congress had merely acted to preclude Bivens relief, but whether Congress had provided an adequate
substitute for Bivens. Otherwise, presumably, legislative attempts to displace Bivens relief could raise constitutional concerns because they would
run the risk of barring access to a judicial forum for resolution of colorable
constitutional claims.37 In Carlson, the Court concluded that the Federal
Tort Claims Act could not meet this standard because “we have here no
explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by federal officers’
violations of the Eighth Amendment may not recover money damages from
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B. Implied Statutory Causes of Action
In marked contrast to the Bivens cases, congressional intent has always
been a linchpin of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning implied
statutory remedies. At a fundamental level, this understanding makes per-
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38. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19.
39. 462 U.S. 367, 385–86 (1983).
40. Id. at 390–91 (Marshall, J., concurring).
41. 487 U.S. 412, 424–29 (1988).
42. Id. at 425. But see id. at 430–49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. To be fair, another place where legislative intent shows up in Bivens cases is the argument that Congress, in various amendments to the FTCA, has affirmatively ratified the Bivens
decision and has thereby given its sanction to the Court’s work in this area. See, e.g., James E.
Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98
GEO. L.J. 117 (2009). Except for a brief passage in Justice Brennan’s opinion in Carlson, see 446
U.S. at 19–20 n.5, the Court has never paid much attention to this argument, which only further
undermines the gravamen of Justice Scalia’s complaint in Malesko.
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the agents but must be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the
view of Congress.”38
But since Carlson, the Supreme Court’s Bivens jurisprudence has retreated rather dramatically from Brennan’s framing of the congressional
displacement inquiry. In Bush v. Lucas, for example, the Court declined to
recognize a First Amendment retaliation claim under Bivens for federal
civil service employees given the existence of a statutory review process
administered by the Civil Service Commission in which the plaintiff’s constitutional claims were “fully cognizable.”39 Thus, even though the statutory
scheme did not—like Bivens—“permit recovery for loss due to emotional
distress and mental anguish,”40 it was enough that Congress acted in a manner that it believed to be comprehensive.
And in Schweiker v. Chilicky, the Court denied Bivens relief for a due
process violation arising out of Social Security benefits application processing, relying on the intricate scheme of administrative and judicial remedies
the Social Security Act provides.41 Although the majority conceded that the
remedies Congress provided were not commensurate with those that would
be available under Bivens, it nevertheless reasoned that “Congress . . . has
not failed to provide meaningful safeguards or remedies for the rights of
persons situated as respondents were.”42
Thus, by the time Malesko was decided in 2001, the Court had moved
back in small but significant steps from the view Justice Brennan articulated
in Carlson. Nevertheless, whether or not Congress had to provide an
equally effective remedy to displace Bivens relief, the existence of a Bivens
remedy in no way required indicia of legislative intent. To the extent that
legislative intent has mattered in Bivens cases, it has only been with respect
to whether such intent cuts against allowing Bivens remedies, rather than in
favor.43
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44. I use the term “virtually” because there may be (exceptionally rare) cases in which the
Constitution does constrain the means pursuant to which Congress provides for the enforcement of
statutory rights. Cf. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872); Martin H. Redish &
Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2006).
45. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
46. Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
47. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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fect sense: Because Congress’s control over statutory rights is virtually plenary,44 it should follow that whether a statute is privately enforceable,
against federal officers or others, is a question for Congress. Thus, the focus
of the evolution in the Court’s implied cause-of-action jurisprudence has
not been the central role of congressional intent nearly as much as it has
been how clear that intent must be.
In Borak, for example, the Court concluded that shareholders could
bring derivative suits to enforce section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 in light of section 27 of the same Act, which granted jurisdiction to the district courts “of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by [the Act].”45 As Justice Clark explained for the unanimous Court,
[i]t is for the federal courts “to adjust their remedies so as to grant
the necessary relief” where federally secured rights are invaded.
“And it is also well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for
such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to
make good the wrong done.”46
Borak thereby suggested that even plausible indicia of legislative intent
would be sufficient to support the inference of a cause of action from a
statute that failed to expressly create one.
The Court retreated somewhat from Borak in Cort v. Ash eleven years
later, with Justice Brennan discerning from the Court’s prior cases a fourprong standard to apply in ascertaining whether a statute implicitly supported a private cause of action:
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted—that is, does the statute create a federal
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States,
so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?47
Although Cort thereby represented a more nuanced approach than the
fairly open-ended standard endorsed in Borak, such analysis nevertheless
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48. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (applying Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66 (1975)).
49. See id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
50. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
51. Id. at 288 (citation omitted).
52. See, e.g., Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party, 555 U.S. 5, 6 (2008) (per curiam). For a
useful post-Sandoval debate over whether a particular statute can be so read, compare Wisniewski
v. Rodale, Inc., 510 F.3d 294, 301–08 (3d Cir. 2007), with id. at 309–13 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
53. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983); Indep. Living Ctr.
of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Maxwell-Jolly v.
Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 992 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2011) (No. 09-958).
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centered on what the Court could divine from congressional intent; all factors but the fourth focus on legislative purpose.48 Thus, even when thenJustice Rehnquist suggested in Cannon v. University of Chicago that subsequently enacted statutes should be more explicit about whether or not Congress intended to allow for private enforcement,49 the point remained:
Courts could infer causes of action so long as it seemed consistent with the
statutory scheme to do so.
Justice Scalia decisively repudiated that understanding in Sandoval.50
There, the Court refused to recognize a cause of action in regulations that
the Department of Justice promulgated pursuant to section 602 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. As Scalia explained for the 5-4 majority: “In determining whether statutes create private rights of action, as in interpreting statutes
generally, legal context matters only to the extent it clarifies text.”51 Thus, a
statute could only be read to support a private cause of action when its text
supported such a reading—even though that would usually only be true in
cases in which the text provided an express cause of action. Sandoval
thereby inverted the prevailing standard, such that contemporary courts will
only recognize implied causes of action when the text of the statute establishes that Congress unambiguously intended to provide one even though it
failed to do so expressly.52 Needless to say, such statutes are few and far
between.
But, whatever the merits of Sandoval’s approach, it is worth emphasizing that the crux of the dispute between the majority and the dissenters—
and between more recent and older case law—boils down to methodological disagreements over statutory interpretation. There is simply no dispute
today that congressional intent is dispositive when it comes to the existence
of a private cause of action to enforce a federal statute; the debate is only
over how that intent should be divined. In addition, the question of whether
a private cause of action should be inferred under a particular statute is
entirely devoid of constitutional considerations. Although distinct issues
may arise when plaintiffs seek to use the Supremacy Clause to enjoin ongoing violations of federal statutes (rather than suing under the statutes themselves),53 constitutional avoidance does not—and should not—factor into
the question of whether to infer a cause of action directly under the statute.
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In that regard, the relationship between Congress and the courts in the context of implied statutory remedies is fundamentally different than their relationship vis-à-vis constitutional remedies.
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54. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (holding that, where it applies, the
Suspension Clause protects a right of access to a judicial forum for resolution of a detainee’s
challenge to his present physical confinement). See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s
Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107
(2009) (discussing Boumediene’s implications with respect to access to courts).
55. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 774–76; Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384 (1977);
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223–24 (1952). See generally Stephen I. Vladeck,
Habeas Corpus, Alternative Remedies, and the Myth of Swain v. Pressley, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 411 (2008) (discussing the limits of Swain and Hayman).
56. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
57. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18,
28, 42 U.S.C.).
58. See 553 U.S. at 771–92.

31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 117 Side B

As Part I demonstrated, although contemporary courts tend to treat judicial reluctance to recognize Bivens remedies and implied statutory causes
of action as related jurisprudential developments, they actually have analytically distinct underpinnings. Although Part I focused on the Court’s own
understanding of, and explanations for, these developments, such discussion
only scratches the surface of why judicial skepticism in the statutory remedies context is not a justification for judicial hesitation in the Bivens context. Thus, Part II offers a brief discussion of the far more comparable
doctrinal frame in which to situate Bivens: the murky but critical area of
constitutionally compelled remedies.
Take habeas, for example. It is now settled that, in at least some cases,
the Constitution requires the availability of some judicial forum for the consideration of a federal prisoner’s habeas claim.54 Tellingly, the remedy need
not be “habeas.” As the Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested, Congress
is free to displace habeas with alternative remedies, so long as those remedies adequately test the underlying legality of the prisoner’s detention.55
Thus, in Boumediene, the majority devoted a substantial portion of its analysis to explaining why the review scheme created by the Detainee Treatment Act of 200556 and the Military Commissions Act of 200657 was an
inadequate substitute for habeas.58 Congress therefore has some discretion
in defining the parameters of the judicial remedy, but that discretion is
bounded by the Constitution itself.
To related—if less controversial—effect is the Court’s jurisprudence
concerning state tax refund remedies and the proposition that “a denial by a
state court of a recovery of taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States by compulsion is itself in contravention of the
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59. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 369 (1930).
60. See 513 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1994).
61. See id. at 111.
62. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
63. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996).
64. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
3409 (2010); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
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Fourteenth Amendment.”59 Thus, as Justice O’Connor explained in Reich v.
Collins, the Due Process Clause itself requires states to provide “clear and
certain” remedies for the refund of state taxes that violate federal law.60
Again, the legislature has some discretion in crafting the parameters of such
a remedy,61 but that discretion is bounded by the Constitution.
The Court’s jurisprudence concerning injunctive relief under the
Supremacy Clause reflects a similar theme. Thus, although Ex parte
Young62 and its progeny require the existence of a judicial remedy for prospective relief against government officers acting in violation of federal
law, the Supreme Court has suggested that such a remedy can be displaced,
at least in cases in which Congress “has prescribed a detailed remedial
scheme for the enforcement . . . of a statutorily created right.”63
Much more can, and should, be said about each of these bodies of law.
The relevant point for present purposes, though, is that each of these examples provides a far better lens through which to understand the relationship
between Congress and Bivens remedies than the jurisprudence concerning
implied statutory remedies does. It is beyond question that the existence of
a Bivens remedy should turn in at least some meaningful way on the extent
to which Congress has legislated in the field, but, whereas the Sandoval line
of cases considers legislative intent necessary to support the existence of a
cause of action, legislative intent matters under Bivens only in cases in
which that intent was to displace a Bivens remedy.
Moreover, I do not offer the above merely as a descriptive claim. Although the Supreme Court has never squarely suggested that Bivens remedies are constitutionally compelled, it has also never held that they are not.
Indeed, notwithstanding at least some lower court decisions to the contrary,64 the Supreme Court has never declined to recognize a Bivens remedy
in a case where the absence of such relief left the plaintiff with no legal
remedy whatsoever. Thus, whereas there is no question that Congress in the
typical case may foreclose a private cause of action to enforce a federal
statute, it is an open question whether Congress may similarly foreclose a
Bivens remedy without providing any alternative means for relief. So long
as that question remains open, courts should not approach the question of
whether to recognize a Bivens remedy with the same reluctance and hesitation that has come to characterize judicial approaches to implied statutory
remedies.
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CONCLUSION
In his Malesko concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that judicial skepticism toward new Bivens remedies is even more appropriate than such skepticism is in the statutory context because “an ‘implication’ imagined in the
Constitution can presumably not even be repudiated by Congress.”65 As
indicated above, there are two distinct flaws with this reasoning: First, it is
simply not true that Congress has no power to displace Bivens remedies. To
the contrary, as Chilicky makes clear,66 Congress can create alternative remedial schemes that are not commensurate with the remedies available
under Bivens, and such statutes will still be held to displace a judicially
inferred cause of action. Second, and more fundamentally, to whatever extent Congress cannot repudiate such a remedy, it is because the Constitution
compels its availability, and so, like habeas, state tax refund remedies, or
Supremacy Clause-based injunctions, legislative constriction of the remedy
would itself risk violating the Constitution.
Put simply, in cases in which the Constitution does not require a Bivens remedy, Justice Scalia is wrong; nothing would stop Congress from
repudiating such relief. And in cases in which the Constitution does require
such a remedy, Justice Scalia is exactly right about Congress but wrong
about the courts. If the Constitution requires relief, it should compel the
courts to act when Congress has not or cannot. Thus, to the extent that
contemporary courts have bought into Justice Scalia’s rhetoric, they are not
only missing the point, but may be doing affirmative violence to the scope
of Bivens and the availability of damages to remedy constitutional violations by federal officers.
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65. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
66. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.

